

BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In re the Matter of HONORABLE MARY ANN OTTINGER, Judge) CJC No. 3811-F-109
King County District Court East Division	STIPULATION, AGREEMENT AND ORDER OF CENSURE

The Commission on Judicial Conduct and the Honorable Mary Ann Ottinger, Judge of the King County District Court, East Division, stipulate and agree as provided herein. This stipulation is submitted pursuant to the Washington Constitution, Article IV, Section 31 and CJCRP 23, and shall not become effective unless and until approved by the Washington Commission on Judicial Conduct.

The Commission on Judicial Conduct is represented in these proceedings by its disciplinary counsel, Paul Taylor. The Honorable Mary Ann Ottinger is represented by Anne Bremner.

I. STIPULATED FACTS

- A. Pattern or Practice of Failing to Observe Defendants' Fundamental Due Process Rights
- 1. The Honorable Mary Ann Ottinger, Respondent, was at all times discussed herein a judge of the King County District Court (KCDC), assigned to what is now the East Division of that court. Prior to the reorganization of the KCDC in 2002, she served as the sole judge in the Issaquah District Court where she was first appointed in 1992.
- 2. In the case of the <u>State v. Sara Totten</u>, 183992A, Respondent failed on multiple occasions to properly advise the unrepresented defendant of her right to court-appointed counsel. Respondent failed to advise defendant of the elements of the crime, of the maximum

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available penalties and other potential consequences of conviction, and failed to utilize a written statement of defendant on plea of guilty form, as required by CrRLJ 4.2. Respondent similarly failed to advise unrepresented defendants of their due process rights in numerous other cases.

- 3. The Commission contacted Respondent with concerns about the adequacy of her rights advisement procedures in 2002. In response, Respondent represented that she would correct her plea acceptance and rights advisement practices in the future to comply with CrRLJ 4.2 and Washington law.
- 4. Respondent thereafter continued to improperly advise defendants of their rights prior to requiring defendants to enter a plea. Specifically, Respondent routinely failed to advise unrepresented defendants of various rights, including but not limited to: (i) the perils of proceeding without counsel, (ii) the right to remain silent, and that anything the accused says may be used against him or her. Respondent also failed to orally make a determination of probable cause prior to imposing conditions of pretrial release (CrRLJ 3.2.1(e)(2)). While Respondent would subsequently advise a defendant who pled guilty that such plea would not be accepted until a later hearing to afford the opportunity to consult counsel, she acknowledges that this practice is inconsistent with CrRLJ 4.2 and that, as noted by the State Supreme Court in *In re Hammermaster*, 139 Wn.2d 211, 236 (1999):

The law is clear that a judge has a duty to ensure that guilty pleas are knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. *Boykin v. Alabama*, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). At a minimum, this requires the defendant be apprised of the essential elements of the offense as well as any mandatory minimum sentence and the statutory maximum. *State v. Holsworth*, 93 Wash. 2d 148, 607 P.2d 845 (1980).

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B. Improper Provision of Legal Assistance to a Municipality.

5. Respondent improperly provided legal assistance to the City of Issaquah, and other municipalities she serves as a KCDC judge for the East Division, in their dispute with King County related to the reorganization and utilization of judicial resources for her division. In addition to providing research and legal advice, Respondent secretly "ghost wrote" correspondence for the City of Issaquah to be submitted to King County without reference or attribution to her. She also actively urged the City of Issaquah to sue King County.

C. Intemperate Treatment of Court Staff.

6. The Commission has information that it believes would tend to prove that Respondent violated Canon 3(A)(3) in her intemperate treatment of court staff members. Respondent denies this occurred. Both parties agree, in lieu of litigating the matter, that Respondent shall undergo management training as provided herein.

II. AGGRAVATING/MITIGATING FACTORS

In accepting this stipulation, the Commission has taken into account the following aggravating and mitigating factors:

a. Whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidence of a pattern of misconduct.

The conduct described in Paragraph 1A was not an isolated incident and constituted a policy or practice that Respondent has followed for years.

b. The nature, extent, and frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct.

The nature, extent and frequency of the due process violations, in particular, have been significant. Hearing tapes suggest that the deficient due process advisement practices were routine for Respondent. Because the practices implicate the Constitutional rights of the defendants involved, the nature of the violations cannot be overstated.

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c. Whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom.

The due process advisement practices in question were conducted in the courtroom.

The remainder of the above conduct occurred outside the courtroom, but was still closely associated with Respondent's professional duties.

d. Whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's official capacity or in the judge's private life.

All of the conduct occurred in the judge's official capacity.

e. The nature and extent to which the acts of misconduct have been injurious to other persons.

The extent to which Respondent's failure to properly advise defendants of their rights has had a substantial impact on the rights of the defendants involved. For example, Sara Totten, then 19 years of age and without any other criminal record, was ultimately ordered to spend a year in jail on an original charge of minor in possession of alcohol. Respondent's actions in providing clandestine legal advice to municipalities, in itself constituting the improper practice of law, exacerbated the conflict inherent in the redistribution of resources in the court system.

f. The extent to which the judge exploited the judge's official capacity to satisfy personal desires.

Respondent's position is that her legal assistance to the City of Issaquah in its dispute with King County was not motivated by any personal desires. Respondent's position is that she was motivated by her perceived obligation to the people of Issaquah who originally voted for her. Such motivation does not, however, entitle her to engage in the practice of law, which is prohibited for a full-time judge, nor does it override her responsibilities to the King County District Court.

g. The effect the misconduct has upon the integrity of and respect for the judiciary.

Protecting the rights of accused individuals is one of the highest duties of any judicial officer. Respondent's failure to adequately perform that duty calls into question the integrity of

her office. In addition, judicial officers are required to protect the appearance of their impartiality.

- h. Whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred.
 Respondent acknowledges that the acts occurred and that she violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
 - Whether the judge cooperated with the Commission investigation and proceeding.
 Respondent has cooperated in the negotiation of this Stipulation and Agreement.
- j. Whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify the conduct.

 Under the terms of this Stipulation and Agreement, Respondent acknowledges her need to change or modify the conduct in question and represents that she will do so, consistent with the requirements listed further below.
 - k. The judge's length of service in a judicial capacity.
 Respondent has served on the bench for 12 years.
 - Whether there has been prior disciplinary action concerning the judge.
 Respondent has no previous disciplinary actions.

III. AGREEMENT

- Respondent stipulates that the conduct described above violated Canons 1, 2, and 3 (A)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
- 2. Respondent stipulates that based upon such conduct, the Commission could impose a sanction in accordance with these rules.
- 3. Respondent stipulates to the acceptance of an order of censure. A censure is a written action of the Commission that finds that the conduct of the Respondent violates a rule or rules of judicial conduct, detrimentally affects the integrity of the judiciary, and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice.
- 4. Respondent agrees that she will participate in training, approved in advance by the Commission, related to the proper administration of her court, including proper

procedures for rights advisement related to accepting pleas and imposing probationary terms and conditions. Specifically, she will attend and complete coursework at the National Judicial College, accredited law school or judicial seminar, or a similar institution/program in such matters no later than one year from the date this stipulation is accepted by the Commission. Respondent agrees she will complete such training at her own expense and will certify the completion of such training in writing within a year of the acceptance of this Stipulation and Agreement by the Commission.

- 5. Respondent further agrees that she will complete counseling at her own expense approved in advance by the Commission to address her management practices. She will likewise certify to the Commission within a year of the acceptance of this Stipulation and Agreement that she has actively engaged in such counseling.
- 6. Respondent agrees and stipulates further that she shall not engage in any retaliatory conduct with regard to any person known or suspected by her to have cooperated with the Commission on Judicial Conduct, or otherwise associated with this matter.
- 7. Respondent and her counsel stipulate that they will make no statements denying, or attempting to excuse or minimize, the conduct set forth herein.
- 8. Respondent stipulates further that by entering into this Stipulation, she hereby waives any procedural and appeal rights pursuant to the Commission on Judicial Conduct Rules of Procedure and Article IV, Section 31 of the Washington State Constitution in this proceeding.
- 9. The Commission stipulates that in exchange for this agreement by Respondent, and conditioned upon Respondent's fulfillment of the conditions of this Agreement, the Commission will take no further action on any of the matters contained in its Statement of Allegations dated July 2, 2003.

DATED this 30 day of April, 2004.

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Honorable Mary Ann Ottinger

Anne M. Bremner, WSBA #13269 Attorney for Respondent

Paul R. Taylor, WSBA #M851 Disciplinary Counsel, Commission on Judicial Conduct

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2 3 BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT 4 OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 5 6 In re the Matter of HONORABLE MARY 7 CJC No. 3811-F-109 ANN OTTINGER, Judge 8 King County District Court ORDER OF CENSURE Eastern Division 9 10 11 Based upon the annexed Stipulation and Agreement, the Commission on Judicial 12 Conduct hereby Orders Judge Mary Ann Ottinger CENSURED for violating Canons 1, 2, and 13 3 (A)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent shall fulfill all of the terms of the 14 Stipulation and Agreement as set forth therein. 15 Dated this 18™ day of JUNG , 2004. 16 17 K. Collins Sprague, Chair 18 Commission on Judicial Conduct 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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